USIA5-M-1
21 April 1954

USIA SURVEY

Memorandum of Meeting of 21 April 1954
1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, 2:00 to 4:00 p.m.

Members of Survey:

Mr. James Q. Rebor, CIA

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Observers:

USIA

Mr. Henry Loomis, SA/Dir
Mr. Andrew H. Berding, AD/IOP
Mr. Ralph Hilton, Chief, American Republics Br./IOP

State

Mr. Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant, Intelligence

CIA

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1. Mr. Berding outlined the organization, functions, apparent intelligence needs, and selected plans of his "Office of Policy and Programs."

    a. **Organization** (see Chart 2, attached). IOP is a staff arm of the Director, and is not in the direct chain-of-command from the Director to the 5 Area Assistant Directors or the media services. There is within IOP a branch corresponding to and assisting each Area Assistant Director. The IOP "News Policy Staff" provides fast guidance to the fast media (press and radio) and has no intelligence needs, due to the speed of its operation. The "Functional Policy and Programs Staff" deals with substantive fields such as economics and religion.

State Department review completed

b. Functions: The Office receives foreign policy guidance
(largely direct from State, but also from NSC and OCB). It
transmutes this into information guidance. It also considers plans
(e.g. "Country Plans") proposed by the field.

c. Apparent Intelligence Needs: The Office could use intelli-
gence on international conferences (e.g., the Stockholm Peace
Congress and The Latin-American Jurisprudence Conference);
personalities (e.g., biographical data on important free-world
nationals with Communist affiliations); segments of Orbit life
(e.g., background data on Soviet agriculture to establish facts of
alleged current cow shortage); and the Orbit's own information and
propaganda operation, including appraisals of probable future
propaganda lines.

d. Selected Plans:

(1) To develop a publication which would stress Orbit
developments of importance to USIA's mission. This product
should be unattributed, unclassified, and capable of being
given by PAO's to selected nationals. It would be comparable
to the U.K. "Interpreter" or to "Soviet Affairs," but different.
If developed as planned it would replace, not supplement,
"Soviet Affairs."

(2) To develop finished, authoritative information on the
Communist conspiracy, in particular the interrelations of
free-world parties and individuals with the Orbit.

2. Mr. Hilton outlined the intelligence needs of his unit and the
present arrangements for meeting those needs. (A paper he prepared will
be circulated and discussed further with him as well as with representatives
of the four other IOP Area Branches.) The following points were brought
out in discussion:

a. Declassification: It was recognized that USIA has a real
need for unclassified information. Some of this information can
probably only be gotten by the declassification of intelligence and
that is not being satisfactorily achieved. The Latin-American
jurisprudence conference experience demonstrates the utility of
declassification of intelligence and may demonstrate how to get
it done. Other attempts have not been successful (notably a recent
DD/P Southeast Asia study).

b. **PAO Reporting:** A capability exists for PAO contributions to intelligence reporting but the capability is reduced by inexperience, lack of direction and understanding, and shortage of personnel (e. g., 35% RIF). It was recognized that PAO's are peculiarly sensitized to USIA needs and hence, if a reporting function could be accomodated with their other functions, they might prove a fruitful source of needed information. Such information, largely overt, might be capable of combination in Washington with classified information in a way which could sanitize the latter for declassified use.

c. **Organizational Arrangements and Communications:** There seemed to be general agreement that present lines to State permit full and easy access to Department facilities. Moreover, the intelligence product of the IAC agencies (including NIE's, NIS, OCI Dailies and Weeklies, and military reports--the latter often delayed) are made available to a limited number in Headquarters and to those PAO's cut in by the Ambassador and his staff.

d. **Intelligence Needs:** These were tentatively and generally divided into:

(1) Intelligence needed for framing the objectives of policy and program -- prospective "inferences" from intelligence, and

(2) Intelligence needed for implementing operations -- detailed, basic, factual.

e. **Intelligence Resources:** The USIA officials felt, and the intelligence representatives did not deny, that present resources (analysts, programs of research, intelligence products) do not meet USIA needs. It was recognized that USIA's priority targets (free world first, orbit second) are the inverse of intelligence priorities (orbit first, free world second). It seemed unrealistic that either USIA or intelligence could invert their priorities. To some extent, and in some appropriate location, new resources seem to be required.

f. **Related Needs of Other Agencies:** There was a marked similarity between certain USIA needs and those of DDP.

cc: Henry Loomis
    Fisher Howe

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